[475 U.S. 159 James Krogsrud, by appointment of the Court, 473 U.S. 903, argued the cause for respondent in No. U.S. 458 , and that "additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel." Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him. (Edwards rule "designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers").1 In short, as we explained in later cases, "Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it `created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.' 447 473 [ The judgments are accordingly affirmed. See, e.g., T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959). Thus, the justification for the prophylactic rules this Court created in Miranda and Edwards, namely, the perceived widespread problem that the police were violating, and would probably continue to violate, the Fifth Amendment rights of defendants during the course of custodial interrogations, see Miranda, supra, at 445-458,3 is conspicuously absent in the Sixth Amendment context. Not only does the Court today cut the Edwards rule loose from its analytical moorings, it does so in a manner that graphically reveals the illogic of the Court's position. My disagreement with the Court stems from our differing understandings of Edwards. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice POWELL and Justice O'CONNOR join, dissenting. The confessions should have been suppressed. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 404. In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained — and the Sixth Amendment violated — because the defendants had "requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations." We express no comment on the validity of the Michigan court's Fifth Amendment analysis. 377 Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the court concluded that the Edwards rule "applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. Ante at 475 U. S. 636 (emphasis added). Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. ", "Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State.". The Court's treatment of this subject is an example of the infirmity of trying to perform the rulemaking function on a case-by-case basis, ignoring the reality that the criminal cases coming to this Court, far from typical, are the "hard" cases. In view of the clear language in our decisions about the significance of arraignment, the State's argument is untenable. Please try again. He asserts that after he requested an appointment of counsel at his arraignment, the police interviewed him without his lawyer present and obtained the confession later used in his criminal trial. See also id., at 410 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("The critical factual issue is whether there had been a voluntary waiver"); id., at 417 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) ("[I]t is very clear that Williams had made a valid [Footnote 2/1] In short, as we explained in later cases, "Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it 'created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.'". [ at 465 U. S. 641. Footnote 1 Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation. 84-1539, pp. 2. And the Court ultimately limits its holding to those situations where the police "initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel." Seen in this proper light, Edwards provides nothing more than a second layer of protection, in addition to those rights conferred by Miranda, for a defendant who might otherwise be compelled by the police to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (1977) (quoting Kirby). Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. Several of our Sixth Amendment cases have indeed erected virtually per se barriers against certain kinds of police conduct. In United States v. Gouveia, we explained the significance of the formal accusation, and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made - and a person who had previously been just a "suspect" has become an "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment - the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation. The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly." [Footnote 9] Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis. . We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985), and we now affirm. U.S., at 485 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment. This argument, however, must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights. 467 [475 The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations. 451 U. S., at 484. Hamilton v. Alabama, In Edwards, this Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right under Miranda v. Arizona, He requested that counsel be appointed for him because he was indigent. 421 Mich., at 63-64, 365 N. W. 2d, at 67. The Court attempts to justify its emphasis on the otherwise legally insignificant request for counsel by stating that "we construe the defendant's request for counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation."

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